Florida Law Review
Volume 51

Issue 4

Article 4

January 1999

The Morass of Internet Personal Jurisdiction: Is It Time for a
Paradigm Shift
Richard Philip Rollo

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard Philip Rollo, The Morass of Internet Personal Jurisdiction: Is It Time for a Paradigm Shift, 51 Fla.
L. Rev. 667 (1999).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol51/iss4/4

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Rollo: The Morass of Internet Personal Jurisdiction: Is It Time for a Pa

CASENOTE
THE MORASS OF INTERNET PERSONAL JURISDICTION:
IT IS TIME FOR A PARADIGM SHIFT
RichardPhilipRollo

I.

INTRODUCTION ......................................

667

IL

BACKGROUND: PERSONAL JURISDICTION ..................

668

11.

BACKGROUND: THE INTERNET ........................

676

IV. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE fR ET ...............
A. The Spider Web Approach ...........................
B. The Highway Approach .............................
1. The Additional Conduct Test ......................
2. The Two-Factor Zippo Test .......................
C. The CyberspaceModel .............................

678
679
684
691
692
693

V. CONCLUSION ........................................

693

'Twas brillig,and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome rathsoutgrabe.1
L INTRODUCTION

As the masses rush to enter the Internet age, people are attempting to
use the World Wide Web as a tool.2 Businesses are creating Web sites in

* To my family, who has always been there for me, and to Lisa, the center of my universe.
1. LEwis CARROLL, THROUGHTHE LOOKING GLAss AND WHAT AUCE FOUND THERE 18-19
(Random House 1946).
2. See Max S. Oppenheimer, In Vento Scribere:The Intersectionof CyberspaceandPatent
Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 229,231 (1999) ('heInternet is an international network of interconnected
computers .... The Internet has experienced extraordinary growth. The number of host computers
... increased from about 300 in 1981 to approximately 9,400,000 by... 1996 .... [In 1996,
albout 40 million people used the Internet... [and] that [number] is expected to mushroom to 200
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an attempt to sell their products to the ever-increasing number of Internet
users. Few realize the enormous risk they are taking. The Internet is a

modem day Pandora's box. People are enticed to open it, but they do not
know what they are unleashing.
When Bill Gates posed the question, "Where do you want to go
today?"3 in Microsoft's advertising campaign for the Windows95 operating
system, few people would have answered, "to court in a distant state."
Recently that is what is happening. Courts are asserting personal
jurisdiction over individuals based upon Internet contacts within their state.
This could mean that a mom and pop business in Florida could be forced
to travel to Alaska to defend a lawsuit based upon an Internet Web site that
offers their products for sale.
Although there is little case law in the area, it is clear that the federal
circuits are employing different standards to determine personal
jurisdiction issues derived from Internet contacts. This paper will discuss
the differing approaches to personal jurisdiction currently being applied.
II. BACKGROUND: PERSONAL JURIsDICTION

Black's Law Dictionary defines personal jurisdiction as the "power of
a court over the person of a defendant."4 The personal jurisdiction
requirement is a constitutional requirement that limits the states' powers. 5

Without personal jurisdiction over the parties involved in a lawsuit, a court
may not adjudicate the issue.6 Generally, there are two ways to get (specific
personal jurisdiction) over a non-resident: 1) physical presence within the
state7 and 2) sufficient minimum contacts with the state.8
million by 1999. Individuals can obtain access to the Internet from many different sources ....
Anyone with access to the Internet may take advantage of a wide variety of communication and
information retrieval methods. These methods are constantly evolving ...Taken together, these
tools constitute a unique medium--known to its users as cyberspace--located in no particular
geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet.")
(quotation marks omitted) (citing Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 233436(1997)).
3. In the mid 1990s, Microsoft's advertising slogan was "Where do you want to go today?"
4. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1144 (6th ed. 1990) ("Personal jurisdiction. The power of a
court over the person of a defendant in contrast to the jurisdiction of a court over a defendant's
property or his interest therein; in personam as opposed to in rem jurisdiction."). See generally
JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE (1997) (giving a general background and analysis of
personal jurisdiction).
5. See generallyU.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (due process clause) (stating the fourteenth
amendment forbids states "from depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law").
6. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(2); International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316
(1945).
7. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
8. See InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 310.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol51/iss4/4

2

Rollo: The Morass of Internet Personal Jurisdiction: Is It Time for a Pa
INTERNET PERSONAL JURISDICTION

In Pennoyerv. Neff, the 1877 Supreme Court stated that "every state
possesses exclusivejurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property
within its territory."9 This state power is "necessarily restricted by the
territorial limits of the state in which it is established."' These few words
encapsulated the court's approach to personal jurisdiction prior to 1945.
The approach limited the states' adjudicative power to citizens and
property within the state's geographical borders.'
The Supreme Court re-defined "presence ' ' 12 in the landmark case of
International Shoe v. 13Washington and promulgated a more flexible,
minimum contacts test to determine personal jurisdiction. The decision
had the effect of broadening the states' powers beyond their geographical
borders in certain instances.14 InternationalShoe involved an action by the
State of Washington to recover state unemployment contributions from the
International Shoe Company. 5 The company was a Delaware corporation
engaged in mail order shoe sales, having its principal place of business in
St. Louis, Missouri." The company did not have offices or warehouses in
Washington 7 nor did it make any contracts to purchase or sell goods
within the state. 8 During the years in question, the company employed
eleven to thirteen salesmen within Washington who were under the control
of supervisors located in St. Louis.'9 The salesmen lived in and solicited
orders within the State of Washington for the shoe company.2' The
Washington Supreme Court took the position that the "regular and
systematic solicitation of orders in [Washington] by [International Shoe's]
salesmen, resulting in a continuous flow of [International Shoe's] product

9. Pennoyer,95 U.S. at 722 (holding that "every State possesses exclusivejurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. As a consequence, every State has the
power to determine for itself the civil status and capacities of its inhabitants.... [N]o State can
exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory."); see also
InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (explaining the Pennoyer v. Neff approach to personal
jurisdiction).
10. Pennoyer,95 U.S. at 720.
11. See id.
12. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (explaining that "the terms 'present' or
'presence' are used merely to symbolize those activities of the [defendant] within the state").
13. See id. at 316 (stating that"due process requires only that... [the defendant must] have
certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice") (quotation marks omitted).
14. See id.
15. Seeid.at311.
16. Seeid. at313.

17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 314 (No salesman had the authority to enter into contractual agreements on
behalf of the shoe company.).
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into the state" was enough to bring International Shoe within the State's
jurisdiction. 2 Citing earlier federal case law,' the Washington Supreme
Court held that the solicitation coupled with "some additional activities"'
within the state was enough to establish jurisdiction.
In the Supreme Court's majority opinion, Chief Justice Stone illustrated
four general situations to explain the rule.24 First, the minimum contacts
test is satisfied when there are continuous and systematic contacts with the
state that give rise to the lawsuit.2 Second, the minimum contacts test is
not met via casual presence or isolated activities for suits unrelated to the
contacts. 26 Third, even if a defendant has continuous and systematic
contacts with the state, the minimum contacts test is not met for suits
unrelated to the contacts.27 Fourth, the Court stated that there are some
contacts that "because of their nature and quality and the circumstances of
their commission, may be deemed sufficient to render the [defendant]
liable to suit." This promulgated a two-factor test for determining
minimum contacts: 1) the level of activity within the state and 2) the
relationship of that activity to the cause of action.29 This vague
constitutional standard 3° led to cases attempting to identify the limit of a
state's authority over extra-jurisdictional individuals.
Since InternationalShoe, the courts have struggled most with the
"nature and quality" aspect of the minimum contacts test.31 Some contacts
have been deemed so meaningful that they alone created minimum
contacts with the forum. 32 In McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co.,
the Supreme Court upheld personal jurisdiction based upon a single
insurance contract.3 In 1944, a California resident purchased a life
insurance policy from an Arizona insurance company.' In 1948, the
International Life Insurance Co., based in Texas, assumed the Arizona
insurance company's policies.35 The Texas insurance company then offered
21. Id
22. See id. (citing International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 587 (1914);
People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 87 (1918); Frene v. Louisville
Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511,516 (D.C. Cir. 1943)).

23. ld.
24. See id. at 317.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See id.
See id.
See id. at318.
Id.
See GLANNON, supra note 4.
See InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 323 (Black, 3., concurring).
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,222 (1957).
See id.
See id. at 223.
See id. at 221.
See id.
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to continue the insurance by mailing a reinsurance certificate to the
California resident.36 The California resident agreed and continued to pay
insurance premiums to the Texas insurance company until his death in
1950.37 The Texas insurance company refused to pay because the
policyholder apparently committed suicide." The beneficiary of the policy
filed suit in California against the Texas insurance company.39 Neither the
Texas insurance company nor the Arizona insurance company ever
maintained an office or an agent in California.' Furthermore, the Texas
company never solicited or did any other insurance business in
California.4" The Court, nevertheless, upheld personal jurisdiction based
on the nature of the contact.42 The suit was based upon the contact with
California, therefore, personal jurisdiction was upheld for purposes of the
contractual suit.4 3 The Court relied upon a recent trend of cases expanding
the scope of states' jurisdictional power over extra-territorial corporations
and individuals.'
The expansive trend continued until the court declined to find personal
jurisdiction in Hanson v. Denckla,45 which relied heavily upon the McGee
argument.46 The case focused on a trust created in Delaware 7 The settlor
of the trust later became domiciled in Florida. One group of claimants
argued that Florida law controlled and the corpus passed via the residuary
clause of the trust settlor's will.49 The competing claimants argued that
Delaware law controlled and the corpus passed pursuant to the settlor's
exercise of an inter vivos power of appointment incorporated in the trust.'
Foregoing some of the details, the case involved two competing decrees.51
On January 14, 1955, a Florida court ruled that the trust was controlled by
Florida law.52 This decision was later upheld by the Florida Supreme
Court, which invalidated the power of appointment created in the Delaware

36. See id.
37. See id. at 222.

38. See id.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id. at 221.
See id. at 222.
See id.
See id. at 223.

43. See id.
44. See id.
45. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
46. See id. at 250.
47. See id. at238.

48. See id.
49. See id. (This was the position of the Florida court.).
50. See id. (This was the position of the Delaware court.).

51. See id.
52. See id. at 242.
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trust.5 3 On January 13, 1956 a Delaware court issued a declaratory
judgement that the power of appointment was valid under Delaware law. 4
On January 14, 1957 the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Florida
decision was not controlling, because Florida lacked personal jurisdiction
over the trust companies and no jurisdiction over the trust res. 55 The case
ended up in the United States Supreme Court. The majority failed to find
sufficient contacts to support personal jurisdiction. The Delaware trust
company at issue: 1) had no office in Florida, 2) never transacted business
in Florida, 3) never solicited business in Florida, and 4) the trust assets
were never held or administered in Florida.56 The power of appointment
was exercised while the settlor was located in Florida, but the court held
that this did not supply an adequate contact to give Florida jurisdiction.57
Chief Justice Warren stated in the majority opinion that
[t]he unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship
with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement
of contact with the forum state. The application of that rule
will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's
activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.58
While requiring 'purposeful availment,' the Court in Hanson failed to
define the term. Nonetheless, courts have seized upon purposeful
availment as one of the primary factors in the minimum contacts test. Soon
the issue became whether or not a foreseeable contact with the forum
should be deemed 'purposeful' and give rise to personal jurisdiction.59
Initially, courts were willing to equate foreseeability with
purposefulness. In Gray v. AmericanRadiator& StandardSanitaryCorp.,
the Illinois Supreme Court upheld personal jurisdiction on the basis of a
stream of commerce argument.' The basic stream of commerce argument
draws an analogy between commerce and a river. If you know that a river
flows in one direction (i.e. into another state) and place an object into the

53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 251.
57. See id. at 253.
58. Id.; see also International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,319 (1945).
59. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d 432 (1957)
(holding'that the foreseeable contact arising form a distributional chain is sufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction without any other contact with the forum).
60. See id.
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river, you know that it will be swept in that direction (i.e. into the other
state). The Gray court was the first to hold that the purposeful availment
requirement for personal jurisdiction could be satisfied by a showing that
a commercial contact was foreseeable. 61 Titan Valve Manufacturing
Company, an Ohio company, produced valves that were used in the
construction of water heaters.62 The valves were sold to American Radiator
& Sanitary Corporation,63 a Pennsylvania corporation. 64 American Radiator
incorporated the valves into water heaters, which were sold to an Illinois
consumer.65 One of the water heaters exploded, injuring the plaintiff.'
Titan's only contact with Illinois was as a supplier to American Radiator.67
The court reasoned that by injecting their product into the stream of
commerce, Titan could foresee "substantial use and consumption" within
Illinois. 6' Furthermore, since the company derived benefits from these
commercial transactions, it was enjoying the benefits of the laws of
Illinois. 69 The court upheld personal jurisdiction.70 "The fact that the
benefit [Titan] derives from [Illinois] laws is an indirect one, however,
does not make it any the less essential to the conduct of [its] business,"'
and, therefore, the use of Titan's products in the course of commerce is a
purposeful availment establishing personal jurisdiction.72 This expansive
reading of the Hanson case further increased a state's power over extraterritorial individuals.
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court revisited the stream of
commerce argument in World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodsen.73 The
plaintiffs, residents of New York, bought an Audi automobile from Seaway
Volkswagen, Inc., in New York.74 While traveling in the Audi through
Oklahoma, the plaintiffs were involved in an automobile accident and
subsequently filed a product liability suit against Seaway in an Oklahoma
court.75 Based on the evidence at trial, this was the only contact between

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See id.
See id. at 434.
See id.
See id. at 432.
See id. at 438.
See id. at 434.
See id. at 438.
Id. at 442.
See id.
See id.at 444.
hd at442.
See id.
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
See id. at 288.
See id.
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Seaway and Oklahoma.7 6 Even though the contact was foreseeable, based

upon the mobile nature of automobiles, the Court held that this alone was
insufficient to support personal jurisdiction. 7' The appropriate
foreseeability issue is whether "the defendant's conduct is such that he
' The Court
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."79
distinguished Gray, and similar cases, as chain of distribution cases, in
which a distributional chain moved the product.' The Court treated the
chain of distribution cases differently than the stream of commerce cases,
in which the consumer's actions moved the product."1 In the former,
personal jurisdiction is generally upheld,82 whereas in the latter, it is not. 3
The dissenting Justices in the case argued that this distinction is artificial."
The dissent went on to say that "[s]ome activities by their very nature may
foreclose the option of conducting them in such a way as to avoid
subjecting oneself to jurisdiction in multiple forums."' 5
The rift between the majority and the dissent in World Wide
Volkswagen was widened in Asahi Metal Industry Corp.v. SuperiorCourt
of California,in which the Supreme Court once again split on the stream
ofcommerce issue.86 The plurality opinion by Justice O'Connor, supported
by four justices, concluded that "[t]he placement of a product into the
stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant
purposefully directed toward the forum state."87 Additional acts, such as
advertising, or tailoring the product to the specific state, may be sufficient
to indicate the intent necessary for purposeful availment. 8' The concurring
opinion adopted the view that injecting a product into the stream of
commerce, with no additional showing of proof, was sufficient to establish
purposeful availment.89 Additionally, Justice Stevens wrote a concurring
opinion arguing that the stream of commerce issue was not currently before
the Court.' The stream of commerce argument factors in greatly when
considering Internet contacts with a state. The conflicting opinions

76. See id.at 289.

77. See id. at 295.
78. See id.at 299.
79. Id. at 297.
80. See id. at 298.

81. See id.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See, e.g., Gray, 22 11. 2d at 432.
See, e.g., World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286.
Seeid. at316.

Id.
480 U.S. 102 (1986).
Id. at 112.

88. See id.
89. See id. at 117.
90. See id.
at 121.
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illustrated in the Asahi opinion further cloud the Internet personal
jurisdiction decisions.
Application ofthe minimum contacts test differs somewhat based upon
the allegations involved.9 1 With intentional torts such as defamation,' and
libel,93 the courts' approach to the minimum contacts test is noticeably
different than with the products liability context from which many of the
Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction opinions arise.' In Huge! v. McNell,
the plaintiff brought a defamation action arising from a newspaper article
published in the Washington Post.9' The plaintiff lived in New Hampshire
and had previous business relations with the defendant that ended on bad
terms." The defendant contacted the Washington Post, alleging that the
plaintiff, recently appointed Deputy Director of Administration for the
CIA, was involved in illegal securities transactions.' The front-page article
circulated via the national news services and resulted in the plaintiff's
resignation from his post.9 The First Circuit Court of Appeals held the
New Hampshire long arm statute granted personal jurisdiction, based on
the argument that the defamation "resulted in injury to [the plaintiff's]
business reputation within New Hampshire." 99 Relying upon the reasoning
of California case law,"° the court found that the allegations were
sufficient to create personal jurisdiction.101 The defendant "knew that
release of the allegedly false information would have a devastating impact
on Hugel, and it can be fairly inferred that they intended the brunt of the
injury to be felt in New Hampshire."' 2 The court concluded that the
defendant could reasonably expect to be haled into court in New
Hampshire. °3 Instead of finding purposeful availment, the court relied
upon the allegation of an intentional tort.1 "° Thus, if the injury was

91. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (illustrating the Court's

approach to libel (intentional tort) cases. The argument rests upon the assumption that the
extrajurisdictional actions created a tort within the jurisdiction.).
92. See, e.g., Hugel v.McNell, 886 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989).
93. See, e.g., Keeton, 465 U.S. at 770.
94. See Hugel, 886 F.2d at 4.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 2.
97. See id.
98. See id.

99. Id.
at 3.
100. See id. at4 (finding personal jurisdiction over non resident defendants "because (i) their
intentional actions were aimed at the forum State, (ii) they knew that the article was likely to have
a devastating impact on the plaintiff, and (iii) they knew that the brunt of the injury would be felt
by the plaintiff in the forum State") (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984)).
101. See id. at5.
102. Id.
103. See id.

104. See id.; see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984) (upholding personal
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intentional, the defendant must have purposefully availed himself of the
forum state.
As it stands, the purposeful availment inquiry is generally determinative
of the minimum contacts test. 5 In addition to this inquiry, the courts also

look to
(1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum state's interest

in adjudicating the dispute, (3) the plaintiff's interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate

judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of the dispute; and (5) the shared interests of the
several
in furthering fundamental substantive social
°6
policies.'states

IIl. BACKGROUND: THE INTERNET
By now, most Americans have some experience with the Interet. 7
Briefly, the Internet is a network of computers that spans more than ninety
countries." s The Internet grew out of a Department of Defense project
called ARPA, 0 9 and has evolved into a global communications device that
connects millions of individuals, businesses, schools, and other
organizations all over the globe. 1 With virtually instantaneous transfers
of information, the Internet is a tool that can be used to communicate
efficiently with the world as a whole.' There are numerous forms of

jurisdiction based on intentional conduct); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781
(1984) (holding personal jurisdiction for a defendant who circulated Hustler magazine nationally
even without minimum contacts with the forum state).
105. See Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, 520 PLI/Pat 975,979 (1998).
106. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,467-77 (1985)).
107. See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 926 (S.D. N.Y. 1996) (estimating that 40 million
individuals had access to the Internet in 1996, and estimating 200 million users by the year 1999);
see also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-31 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
108. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 925.

109. See id. at 925-26 ("What we now refer to as the Internet grew out of an experimental
project of the Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Administration ("ARPA")
designed to provide researchers with direct access to supercomputers at a few key laboratories and
to facilitate the reliable transmission of vital communications .... What we know as "the Internet"
today is the series of linked, overlapping networks that gradually supplanted ARPANet. Because
the Internet links together independent networks that merely use the same data transfer protocols,
it cannot be said that any single entity or group of entities controls, or can control, the content made
publicly available on the Internet or limits, or can limit, the ability of others to access public
content.").
110. SeeACLUv. Reno,929 F. Supp. at 831.
111. See id.
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information retrieval"1 and communication on the Internet."' One of the
most popular forms of communication on the Internet is the World Wide
Web. i1 4 The Web is comprised of documents in "hypertext markup
language" (HTML). The documents are not centrally stored, but are stored

on computers spread all over the world."1 5 The Web uses uniform resource

locators (URLs) attached to each document as addresses on the Internet in
order to find the information." 6 These addresses tell the location of the
document on the Internet '1 7 (i.e. the server on which the document resides).
Documents on the Web use the hypertext transfer protocol (HTrP) 1 and
many contain links, 9 which enable a user to switch the current document

to another related document (possibly on another server in another state).
The links allow the user's Web browser to navigate between different
servers and documents without the user knowing the location of the

document. When a message is sent from one location to another on the
Internet, the message can travel many different routes to its final
destination.'2 For example, a message sent from Florida to Alaska could
be sent to a switching station in Washington DC, then Atlanta, then Dallas,
then Detroit, then Los Angeles, and then finally to Alaska. The message,
once sent, is broken into subparts called "packets" which travel
independently and are reassembled at the destination.121 The packets
typically travel along the same route, but they may take different routes to

112. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 928-29 (explaining briefly services such as File-Transfer
Protocol (FTP), Gopher services, and the World Wide Web).
113. See id.at 927-28 ("Perhaps the most widely used Internet service is electronic mail, or
.e-mail ....
[A] user is able to address and transmit a message to one or more specific individuals.
*..Internet users may also transmit or receive 'articles' posted daily to thousands of discussion
groups.... The Internet also offers opportunities for multiple users to interest in real time."); see
also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 834 (explaining that there are basically 6 types of Internet
communications "(1) one-to-one messaging (such as 'e-mail'), (2) one-to-many messaging (such
as 'listserv'), (3) distributed message databases (such as 'USENET newsgroups'), (4) real time
communication (such as 'Internet Relay Chat'), (5) real time remote computer utilization (such as
'telnet'), and (6) remote information retrieval (such as 'ftp', 'gopher', and the 'World Wide
Web').').
114. See Shea,930 F. Supp. at 929 ("Documents available on the Web are not collected in any
central location; rather, they are stored on servers around the world running Web server
sofware....
To gain access to the content available on the Web, a user must have a Web 'browser'
...capable of displaying documents in 'hypertext markup language' ('HTML'), the standard Web
formatting language.').
115. Seeid.at929.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.(Links are "highlighted text or images that, when selected by the user, permit him
to view another, related Web document.").
120. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
121. See id.at 832.
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the destination." Thus, a message could be broken into hundreds of
independently traveling packets that could collectively enter every state on
their route to their destination. The particular path taken between the origin
and the location is not chosen by the sender and it usually remains

unknown.
IV. PERSONAL JuRISDICrION AND THE INTERNET
A state's need for jurisdiction has increased with the advent of new
technology." Much of today's modem commerce is conducted via
telephone wires, by individuals who never enter the foram.u This led to

the Supreme Court's holding in 1985 that personal jurisdiction may not be
avoided merely because the person is not present within the state.'I With
the explosion of computers in the 80's, the question soon became what
Internet contacts are sufficient to support personal jurisdiction?
Many courts hold that the appropriate personal jurisdiction standard
based upon Internet contacts is analogous to the stream of commerce
standard in Asahi. 6 This analogy shaped two main tests employed to
determine personal jurisdiction based on Internet contacts. There have been
several cases in which personal jurisdiction has been found based upon
Internet contacts," and several similar cases in which personal jurisdiction

122. See id.
123. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958) ("As technological progress has
increased the flow of commerce between States, the need for jurisdiction over non-residents has
undergone a similar increase.").
124. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,476 (1985).
125. See id.
126. See David L. Stott, PersonalJurisdictionin Cyberspace:the ConstitutionalBoundary
of Minimum ContactsLimited to a Web Site; 15 . MARSHALL J.COMPUTER & INFO. L. 819, 839
(Summer 1997) (citing Sonia K. Gupta, BulletinBoardSystems and PersonalJurisdiction:What
Comports with FairPlay and Substantial Justice?, 1996 U. CHL LEGAL F. 519, 533 (1996)
(discussing how a "BBS operator injects the BBS into the stream of cyberspace" or commerce as
an analogy with Justice O'Connor's opinion of the stream of commerce)).
127. See Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, 520 PLI/Pat 975 (discussing the following
cases: CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); Thompson v. Handa-Lopez,
Inc., No. CIV.A. SA97-CA1008EP, 1998 WL 142300 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 25,1998); Mieczkowksi
v. Masco Corp., No. 5:96CV286, 1998 WL 125678 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 1998); Gary Scott Ralph
Int'l, Inc. v. Baraoudi, 981 F. Supp. 714 (D. Mass. 1997); Hasboro, Inc, v. Clue Computing, Inc.,
No. CIV.A. 97-10065-DPW, 1997 WL 836498 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 1997); Haelan Prods. Inc. v.
Beso Biological, No. 97-0571, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10565 (E.D. La. July 11, 1997); Telco
Communications Inc. v. An Apple A Day, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Va. 1997); People v.
Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d468 (Sup. Ct. NY Co. 1997); ResuscitationTechs., Inc. v. Continental Health
Care Corp., No. IP96-1457-C-M/s, 1997 WL 148567 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 1997); Hall v. LaRonde,
66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Cal. Court. App. 1997); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech, Inc., 960 F.
Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997); Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 43 (D. Conn. 1997); Zippo Mfg. Co. v.
Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997); Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F.
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has not been found." The cases reflect the courts' struggle to
conceptualize the nature of Internet contacts. There are three basic
approaches to conceptualizing the Internet, the spider web approach, the
highway approach, and the Cyberspace approach. 29
A. The Spider Web Approach
The spider web approach treats the Internet as simultaneously
contacting all points on the World Wide Web. "[A]t each point the Web
touches a physical place; the location of the computer creates that place on
the Internet.... [E]ach person who places his message on the Internet
places his presence at every point on the... Web."'" Thus, if a person
located in California contacts a Web site in New York, the contact occurs
in both New York and California.
The Spider web approach is consistent with the Brennan concurrence. 3'
in Asahi. The opinion described the stream of commerce as referring "not
to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow

Supp. (D.D.C. 1996); Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227,1996 WL767431
(Minn., Dist Court. Dec. 11, 1996), aff'd 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Court. App. 1997); Maritz, Inc.
v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996); EDIAS Software Int'l, LLC v. BASIS Int'l
Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996); Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D.
Cal. 1996); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996); California
Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356 (C.D. Cal. 1986); and Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
128. See id.(discussing the following cases: Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp.
295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aft'd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d
414 (9th Cir. 1997); MallinckrodtMed., Inc. v. Sonus Pharms., Inc., No. 9701732 (PLF), 1998 WL
6546 (D.C. D.C. Jan. 5, 1998); SF Hotel Co. v. Energy Invs., Inc., No. 97-1306-JTM, 1997 WL
74948 (D. Kan. Nov. 19, 1997); Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., No. 97 C. 4943, 1997
WL 733905,45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1097 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17,1997); Expert Pages v. Buckalew, No. C-972109-VRW, 1997 WL488011 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 1997); Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327
(D. N.J. 1997); Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Ark. 1997); E-Data
Corp. v. Micropatent Corp., No. Civ 3:96cv523 JBA, 1997 WL 8085282 (D. Conn. Sept. 30,1997);
Agar Corp. v. Multi-Fluid, Inc., No. 95-5105,1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7121,45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1444 (S.D. Tex. June 25, 1997); Graphic Controls Corp. v. Utah Med. Prods., Inc. No. 96-CV0459E(F), 1997 WL 276232 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 1997); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ.
3620, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997); IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., 958 F.
Supp. 1258 (N.D. M11.1997), affrd in part vacated in part, 136 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 1998);
McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Civ. No. 95-4037, 1996 WL 753991 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 1996);
Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351 (3d DCA), review denied,645
So.2d 455 (Fla. 1994); and Naxos Resources (U.S.A.) Ltd. v. Southam Inc., No. CV 96-2314,1996
WL 662451 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 1996).
129. See generally Leif Swedlow, Three Paradigmsof Presence: A Solution for Personal
Jurisdictionon the Internet,22 OKLA. CrrY U.L. REV. 337 (Spring 1997).
130. Id. at 370.
131. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1037 (Blackmum, Marshall, & White, J.J., concurring).
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'
of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale."132
Brennan
pointed to Gray as precedent for the stream of commerce argument,' and
concluded that World Wide Volkswagen "preserved the stream-ofcommerce theory."' 34 The concurring opinion stated that merely placing a
product into the stream of commerce without more is sufficient to establish
purposeful availment if the normal course of business regularly carries the
product into the forum state. 135 When placed in the context of the Internet,
this is basically the spider web theory of the Internet. Because the Internet
regularly carries information into every jurisdiction, someone placing a
Web site (analogous to a product) on the Internet should anticipate being
haled into court in every state. Although not citing to Brennan's Asahi
concurrence, cases such as Inset Systems, Inc. v. InstructionSet, Inc. 36 and
Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts137 have seemingly adopted this
approach. The Internet cases "require only the defendant's knowledge that
its World Wide Web advertisement can reach forums where the World
Wide Web reaches." 138 Brennan's approach requires that the defendant is
"aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum state."' 39 This
greatly expands the power of every state. Under this approach, the sponsor
of the Web site would be subject to regulation by every state. There is no
guarantee that the state regulations will not conflict. The effect would be
a significant disincentive to anyone wishing to place information on the
Internet.
The approach is illustrated in Inset Systems.'4 Inset, a Connecticut
14
corporation, developed computer products and provided related services. 1

132. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117.

133. See id.at 120.
134. Id.
135. Seeid. at ll7.
136. See 937 F. Supp. 161,164-65 (D. Conn. 1996) (After concluding that ISI's Internet Web
page, which contained a 1-800 telephone number, was directed toward both Connecticut and all
other states, the court concluded that "once posted on the Internet, unlike television and radio
advertising, the advertisement is available continuously to any Internet User. ISI has therefore,
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business within Connecticut.").
137. See No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *4 (D. Minn. Dec. 11, 1996) (defendant
maintained an informational Web site which included a mailing list, and a 1-800 number. After
concluding that On Ramp's Internet Web page was directed toward both Minnesota and all other
states, the court relied upon the Inset case to find personal jurisdiction.); see also Maritz v.
Cybergold, 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (concluding that Cybergold's Internet Web
page, which contained a mailing list, was directed toward both Missouri and all other states, the
court relied upon the reasoning of the Inset case to find personal jurisdiction).
138. Christopher W. Meyer, World Wide Web Advertising:PersonalJurisdictionAround
the
Whole Wide World?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1269, 1314 (1997).
139. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 104.
140. 937 F.Supp.at 161.
141. See id. at 162.
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Instruction Set, Inc., (ISI) was a Massachusetts corporation that also
provided computer products and related services. 42 Inset registered the
federal trademark INSET. 43 Subsequently, ISI obtained the Internet
domain name 44 "INSET.COM" and maintained the telephone number "1800-US-INSET."' 45 Inset sued ISI in Connecticut. The United States
District Court of Connecticut held that the Connecticut long arm statute
granted jurisdiction," and that granting jurisdiction would not violate the
due process clause."4 Inset argued that Internet advertising 48 coupled with

the availability of a toll free telephone number demonstrates that ISI
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business within
Connecticut. 149 The court agreed stating that the Internet advertising and
the toll-free telephone number were intended to communicate to every
state and, thus, they were purposefully directed at Connecticut." 0
The Inset view of Internet minimum contacts was expanded in
Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts,' in which the United States District
Court in Minnesota found that the act of "placing [an] ad on the Internet
24 hours [a day], seven days a weeks, 365 days a year" creates personal
jurisdiction in any state.152 Granite Gate Resorts doing business as On
Ramp Internet Computer Services (On Ramp)5 3 created a Web site
providing information about wagering via the Internet. "4 The site
contained an advertisement for WagerNet, a betting service provided by
Global Gaming Ltd. of Belize,' and a legal disclaimer about betting via

142. See id.
143. See id. at 163.
144. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1121 n.1 (W.D. Pa.
1997) ("Domain names serve as a primary identifier of an Internet user... Businesses using the
Internet commonly use their business names as part of the domain name (e.g. IBM.orn) .... The
designation ".corn" identifies the user as a commercial entity.") (citations omitted).
145. See Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 163.
146. See id. at 164.
147. See id. at 165.
148. See id. ("[S]ince March, 1995, ISI has been continuously advertising over the Internet,
which includes at least 10,000 access sites in Connecticut.").
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 11, 1996).
152. Id. at 11.
153. See id. at 2.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 2 ('There is a $100 set up fee, for necessary hardware and software. For
security and privacy, all members are issued a card system linked to their personal computer to
access WagerNet. Once on-line the bettor selects the team/s and amount/s they wish to wager.
WagerNet then matches your bet with [one] opposing bettor or bettors to cover your wager.
WagerNet charges each bettor a transaction fee of ONLY 2.5% as opposed to the 10% fee charged
by most bookmakers.").
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telephones.'56 The advertisement explained the WagerNet betting system,
and provided a phone number for additional information.1 57 In addition, the
Web site contained an option to become part of WagerNet's mailing list.158
Another advertisement contained the toll free telephone number for All
Star Sports Handicapping Service,'59 which provides predictions about
upcoming sporting events."6 The attorney general of Minnesota filed for
an injunction against On Ramp seeking to prevent Minnesotans from
accessing the site. 6' At the time, there were 507,050 Internet users in
Minnesota, roughly eleven percent of the overall population.
The district court employed a five factor test to determine the
constitutional validity of the state exercising personal jurisdiction: 1)
quantity of contacts, 2) nature and quality of the contacts, 3) relatedness
between the contacts and the cause of action, 4) interest of the state, and 5)
convenience of the parties. 63 Relying upon Inset,1 " the court stated that On
Ramp's Web site coupled with a toll-free telephone number was enough
to show purposeful availment of Minnesota law. 6 5 On Ramp argued that
Inset was based upon the geographical proximity of Massachusetts and
Connecticut (the location of the plaintiff and the defendant,
respectively). 16 The GraniteGate Resorts court was unpersuaded by the
argument and held that the 1,800 miles between Minnesota and On Ramp
was deemed to have "no relevancy whatsoever."' 67 The court concluded
that in today's age of mass communication and high technology, it is not
unreasonable68 for a Nevada company to travel to Minnesota to defend
themselves.

156. See id.("NOTE: PLEASE CONSULT YOUR LOCAL, COUNTY, AND STATE AtrHORITIES
REGARDING RESTRICTIONS ON OFF-SHORE SPORTS BETrING VIA TELEPHONE BEFORE REGISTERING
WrrHWAGERNET.").
157. See id.
158. See id.at 4.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.at 1.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 6.
164. Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 165 (quoting Inset. "The Internet as well as toll-free
numbers are designed to communicate with people and their business in every state. Advertisement
on the Internet can reach as many as 10,000 Internet users within Connecticut alone. Further, once
posted on the Internet, unlike television and radio advertisement, the advertisement is available
continuously to any Internet user. ISI has therefore purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
doing business within Connecticut.").
165. See Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *7 (D.
Minn. Dec. 11, 1996).
166. See id.

167. Id.
168. See id.
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The court first focused on the quantity of the contacts between On
Ramp and Minnesota. 169 The contacts were primarily a result of "an
electronic impulse from a [Minnesota] computer.., sent to the computer
where the Web page is stored; the information from the Web page then
electronically sends itself into Minnesota to the computer user." 170 The
Attorney General identified 248 contacts between different Minnesota
computers and On Ramp during a two week trial period, which equate to
approximately 6,448 contacts per year. 171 "Due to the two-way transfer of
information on the Internet, this means that the Defendants transmitted
words and images to Minnesota each time one of those [6,448] computers
accessed Defendants' Web site."172 The defendant claimed that the Internet
contacts were unilateral, but the court concluded that the system
automatically sent images when the Minnesota user contacted the URL
address for VEGAS.COM, otherwise the user would only see a blank
screen." Additionally, the court concluded that seventy-five phone calls
to the All Star Sports toll-free telephone number should be attributed to On
Ramp's contacts with Minnesota. 74
The second prong of the test focused on the nature of the contacts
between On Ramp and Minnesota.I7 5 The court viewed the Web site as
purposefully soliciting Minnesota residents, because it "logically appears
to be maintained for the purpose... of being accessed and used by any and
all Internet Users, including Minnesota residents."' 176 With little analysis,
the minimum
the court concluded that the Web site certainly provides
77
contacts necessary for personal jurisdiction purposes.'
The third and fourth prong considered the relatedness between the
79
178
cause of action and the contacts, and the states' interests, respectively. 1
The attorney general sought to regulate the out-of-state Web site for the
protection of Minnesota's residents. "oVia analogy to radio advertisements,
the court concluded that the contacts were sufficiently related to the cause

169. See id. at 6-7.
170. Id. at 1.
171. See id. at 8 ("Defendant's Web sites are setup so that they can record all of the Internet
protocol numbers or URL addresses of the computer accessing them... The URL addresses
uniquely identify the location of the [accessing] computer.").
172. Id.

173. See id. at 9.
174. See id. (explaining that the calls, at $25 per call, resulted in $1,525 worth of revenue).

175. Seeid. at6.
176. Id. at 10.

177. See id.
178. See id.
179. Seeid. at 10-11.

at 10.
180. See id.
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of action.' The state has a valid interest, because if the attorney general
cannot bring a consumer protection action in Minnesota, the suit may not
be pursued at all."2 "It is the duty of the state to protect its residents from
such unfair business practices. If our courts are not open, the state will be
without remedy in any court and the consumer protection act will be
rendered useless."''
The final prong focused on the inconvenience of the parties.'" The
court seized upon a term in the WagerNet agreement claiming Belizean
jurisdiction over all disputes."1 The court argued that, relative to Belize,
jurisdiction by Minnesota must be more convenient. 186 With that, the court
concluded that the act of placing an advertisement on the Internet equates
to purposeful availment of Minnesota laws, supporting personal
jurisdiction."8 7
Although not discussed, the case implicitly involves a stream of
commerce argument.' The defendants injected (posted) their Web site
into the Internet where it would necessarily be swept into every state (and
nation).8 9 The court concluded, that although they did not specifically
intend to target Minnesota, this purpose was imputed to it based on the
foreseeability of its Web site 'entering' Minnesota. " Under the spider web
approach to Internet jurisdiction, every state would have concurrent
jurisdiction over virtually any Internet presence. 91
B. The Highway Approach
The highway approach is a narrow view of the Internet. Under this
approach, the Internet is treated like a highway system which allows a user
to travel from one location to another. The basic premise is that an
individual user cannot be at two places at once.
In other words, the court would endeavor to literally follow
the data stream either to its source or destination. Telephone

181. See id.
182. See id. at 11.
183. Id.(quoting State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 502 P.2d 290 (Wash. 1972)).

184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id.

187. See id.
188. See generally Asahi v. California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Il. 1961).
189. See Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *5 (D.
Minn.Dec. 11, 1996).

190. See id. at 6-10.
191. See generally Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass.
1997).
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communication is viewed by means of this paradigm already.
Personal jurisdiction is usually limited to the receiving end of
a telephone call. The person initiating contact knows where
his call is going, but the receiver does not always know (or
care) where the call comes from. The caller purposefully
directs his activity to the callee's forum.
On the Internet, application of this method would require
a court to determine who initiated the contact. 1
An Internet user, by contacting a Web site, is traveling to a Web site.
Thus, if a person in California contacts a Web site in New York, the
contact occurs in New York but not in California. This conceptualization
is consistent with Justice O'Connor's approach to the stream of commerce
argument in the Asahi plurality opinion. 193 The plurality stated that the
substantial connection between a defendant and the forum
State necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must
derive from an action purposely directed toward the forum
state, and the mere placement of a product into the stream of
commerce is not such an act, even if done with an awareness
that the stream will sweep the product into the forum State
absent additional conduct indicating an intent to serve the
forum state market. 94
When placed in the context of the Internet, merely placing a Web site on
the Internet is not enough to establish personal jurisdiction; you must have
additional conduct. If browsing the Internet is sufficient additional conduct
to support jurisdiction, then this approach is analogous to the highway
theory of the Internet. Cases such as Pres-Kap v. System One,195
96 and BensusanRestaurantCo. v. King,197 have
CompuServe v. Patterson,1
adopted this approach to personal jurisdiction.
Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc.,98 was an early
Florida district court case attempting to characterize the nature of computer
based contacts.199 Pres-Kap was a travel agency doing business solely in
New York.2° System One was a Delaware company which leased

192. Swedlow, supra note 129, at 375-76.
193. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 103-04. Joined by the Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell, and

Justice Scalia.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 103-04.
636 So. 2d 1351 (3d DCA Fla. 1994).
89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
937 F. Supp. 295 ($.D.N.Y. 1996).
636 So. 2d 1351 (1994).
See id. at 1353.
See id. at 1352.
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computer-based airline reservation systems. 20 1 System One provided
terminals that provided access to System One's Miami-based computer
system. 2' Pres-Kap negotiated and signed a contract with System One at
a branch office in New York, which was forwarded to Miami where a
System One representative signed the contract. 20 3 When the contract was
breached, System One filed suit against Pres-Kap in Florida. 204 Pres-Kap's
only contact with Florida was that they "(1)... forwarded all rental
payments under the contract to [System One's] billing office in Miami, and
(2) the computer database . . . which [Pres-Kap] accessed through
computer terminals, [was] located in Miami."' The court held that PresKap did not meet the minimum contacts test and was not subject to
personal jurisdiction,' reasoning that "an individual's contract with an
out-of state party alone cannot automatically establish sufficient minimum
contacts"' in a forum. The fact that the computer database was located in
Miami was insufficient to change the result. 2 8 In dicta, the majority
asserted that even if Pres-Kap knew the computer database was located in
Miami, it would not alter the reasonable expectation of not being haled into
court in Florida.' Furthermore, the court reasoned that a contrary decision
would be "wildly beyond the reasonable expectations of... computerinformation users." 210
A mere two years later CompuServe v. Pattersonwas decided by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, seemingly inconsistently with the dicta in
Pres-Kap. 1 Patterson was a Texas lawyer who also wrote shareware2 2
programs. Patterson entered into an agreement with CompuServe,2 13 an

201. See id. at 1351.
202. See id. at 1352.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 1351.
205. Id at 1353.
206. See id.
207. Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,478 (1985)).
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. Id. ("[A] contrary decision would, we think, have far reaching implications for business
and professional people who use "on-line" computer services for which payments are made to outof-state companies where the database is located. Across the nation, in every state, customers of
"on-line" computer information networks have contractual arrangements with out-of-state supplier
companies, putting such customers in a situation similar, if not identical, to the defendant in the

instant case.").
211. 89F.3d 1257.
212. See id. at 1260 ("Shareware makes money only through the voluntary compliance of an
"end user". .. who may or may not pay the creator's suggested licensing fee if she uses the software
beyond a specified trial period.").
213. See id. ("CompuServe is a computer information service.... It contracts with individual
subscribers, such as [Patterson], to provide inter alia, access to computing and information services
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Ohio company. The agreement purportedly created an independent
contractor relationship2" 4 between Patterson and CompuServe whereby
Patterson was allowed to place his shareware programs on CompuServe's
system for distribution.21 5 Patterson submitted thirty-two Shareware
programs which were downloaded by twelve Ohio residents.21 6
CompuServe began marketing a similar software product which Patterson
believed infringed upon his common law trademarks. 2 7 CompuServe
eventually filed a declaratory judgment action in federal district court in
Ohio.21 ' Patterson's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was
granted, and CompuServe appealed.219
Although the contacts were primarily electronic, the circuit court stated
that "[s]o long as a commercial actor's efforts are 'purposefully directed'
toward the residents of another state, we have consistently rejected the
notion that an absence of physical contacts" defeats personal jurisdiction.
It is important to note that Patterson and CompuServe entered into a
Shareware Registration Agreement ("SRA") and a CompuServe Service
Agreement.221 The agreements stated that they were entered into in Ohio.2z
The court held, based on a prima facie standard, that the contacts were
substantial enough to result in personal jurisdiction.2 The court was quick
to limit it's holding;
[B]ecause of the unique nature of this case, we deem it
important to note what we do not hold. We need not and do
not hold that Patterson would be subject to suit in any state
where his software was purchased or used .... We also do not
have before us any attempt by another party from a third state
to sue Patterson in Ohio for, say a "computer virus" caused by
his software.... Finally, we need not and do not hold that
CompuServe may... sue any regular subscriber to its service
for nonpayment in Ohio.'

via the Internet.").
214. See id.
215. See id. ("The end-user pays that fee directly to CompuServe in Ohio, and CompuServe
takes a 15% fee for its trouble before remitting the balance to the shareware's creator.").
216. See id. at 1261.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. Id. at 1264 (quoting BurgerKing, 476 U.S. at 2184).
221. See id. at 1260.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 1268.
224. L

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 4 [1999], Art. 4
FLORIDA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 5 1

The determinative issue for the court was the nature of the electronic
contracts and electronic course of dealings. The district court relied upon
Health Communications,Inc. v. Marinerto characterize the nature of the
contact between Patterson and CompuServe, finding the relationship was
"marked by a 'minimal course of dealing,' [and] was insufficient to satisfy
the purposeful availment test." 6 The Court of Appeals differentiated
Health Communications227 however, and relied upon Burger King 8 to
uphold personal jurisdiction. 9 This was a simple contract case" for the
Court of Appeals. Patterson purposefully availed himself of doing business
in Ohio by signing the SRA contract. He then "perpetuated the relationship
with CompuServe via repeated communications with its system in
Ohio."'23 ' The purposeful availment criteria was satisfied by Patterson
signing the contract and not the subsequent electronic communications.
Thus, one could read CompuServe as standing for the proposition that
electronic contracts are contracts and should be treated as such.
Bensusan RestaurantCorp. v. King' 2 involved the famous Blue Note
jazz club, located in New York City. 3 The defendant, King, owned ajazz
club in Missouri, also named "The Blue Note."3 King posted a general
access Web site235 on the Internet containing general and ticketing
information about the Blue Note club (in Missouri). 6 The ticketing
information contained "the names and addresses of ticket outlets in
Columbia and a telephone number for charge-by-phone ticket orders,
which are available for pick-up on the night of the show. 2 3 7 Bensusan's
complaint included allegations that King's Web site infringed upon their
trademark "The Blue Note" (in New York). 8 The court viewed the issue
as "whether the existence of a site on the World Wide Web... without
anything more, [was] sufficient to vest [the New York Court] with personal
jurisdiction over [King]." 9
225. See id. at 1264.
226. Id. (quoting 860 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).227. See id.
228. See id. (explaining BurgerKing in the parenthetical).
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. Id.
232. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
233. See id. at 297.
234. Id.
235. See id. ('he Web site is a general access site, which means that it requires no
authentication or access code for entry, and is accessible to anyone around the world who has
access to the Internet.").
236. See id.
237. Id. at 298.
238. See id.
239. Id.
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Although the holding was based upon New York's long arm statute
the court stated that upholding personal jurisdiction would violate the Due
Process clause. 1 Although the result in Bensusan is different than that in
CompuServe, the district court distinguished the two cases factually. 2 The
court stated that unlike Bensusan, CompuServe involved a defendant who:
1) specifically targeted the forum state, 2) contractually arranged to sell
goods in the state, 3) advertised in the forum state, and 4) repeatedly sent
software into the forum state.243 The court in Bensusan applied a three
factor test:' 1) whether there was purposeful availment by King, 5 2)
whether King should have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in
New York based on his contacts with New York, 46 and 3) "whether [King]
carries on a continuous and systematic part of its general business within
the forum state."'247 The court reasoned that creating a Web site is
analogous to placing a product into the stream of commerce. Adopting
theAsahi plurality approach, the court stated that even though the Web site
has potentially world-wide effects, King did not purposefully avail himself
of New York law by merely creating a Web site.249
Although most cases follow arguments growing out of the Asahi
decision, other courts have proposed different tests for determining
personal jurisdiction based on Internet contacts. The Zippo Manufacturing
Company (Manufacturer), located in Pennsylvania, makes "Zippo" tobacco
lighters.' 0 Zippo Dot Coin (Dot Coin), located in California, operates an
Internet Web site and has the exclusive right to use the Internet domain
names "ZIPPO.COM," "ZIPPO.NET," and "ZIPPO.NEWS."25 The right
to use an Internet domain name was based upon registration of the name
with Network Solutions. z 2 Dot Coin's Web site contained advertisements
and provides news services for a fee. 3 Users wishing to purchase the
Internet news service fill out an electronic application which includes their

240. See id. at 298-99.
241. See id. at 300.

242. See id.
243. See id.

244. See id.
245. See id. at 300-01; see also Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250-51.
246. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301; see also World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286.
247. Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301.

248. See id.
249. See id.
250. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1121 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
251. See id.
at 1121 n.3 (Network Solutions "contracted with the National Science Foundation
252. See id.
to provide registration services for Internet domain names. Once a domain name is registered to one
user, it may not be used by another.").

253. See id.
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address.' The payments are then made either via the Internet or by
telephone. 5 Manufacturer sued Dot Corn alleging trademark dilution,
infringement, and false designation, among other state law counts.356 The

United States District Court in Pennsylvania first reviewed the
development of personal jurisdiction, then summarized that the above
cases can be viewed as creating a continuum upon which all Internet
personal jurisdiction cases should be placed. 7 At one end of the spectrum
are cases such as CompuServe, in which the defendant has contractual

relations with individuals within the forum that involve substantial
computer contacts." At the other end of the spectrum are individuals who
merely provide information on Web sites that are accessible to all, such as
in Bensusan.59 The gray areain the middle contains interactive Web sites
that allow two-way exchange of information." When dealing with this
gray area, the case should be analyzed using a two factor test: 1) the level
of interactivity of the site, and 2) the commercial nature of the site.261 The
court limited application of the test by dividing the above spectrum into
three categories: 1) "Internet Advertising" cases such as Inset and
Bensusan,262 2) "Interactivity" cases such as Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGol,
Inc. 263 and Granite Gate Resorts, 264 and 3) "Doing Business over the

254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See id. at 1121.
257. See id. at 1124 ("[O]ur review of the available cases and materials reveals that the
likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to
the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet. This sliding
scale is consistent with well developed personal jurisdiction principles.").
258. See id. ("At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does
business over the Internet. If the defendant enters into contacts with residents of a foreign
jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet
259. See id.
("Apassive Web site that does little more than makeinformation availableto those
who are interested in it is no grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.").
260. See id.
261. See id. ("[O]ur review of the available cases and materials reveals that the likelihood that
personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and
quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Interet.").
262. See generallyInset Sys. v. Instruction Set, 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996); Bensusan
Restaurant Co. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
263. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996); see also 7ippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124-25 ('The
defendant had put up a Web site as a promotion for its upcoming Internet service. The service
consisted of assigning users an electronic mailbox and then forwarding advertisements for products
The court reasoned
and services that matched the users' interests to those electronic mailboxes ....
that the defendant's conduct amounted to 'active solicitations' and 'promotional activities'
designed to 'develop a mailing list of Internet users' and that the defendant 'indiscriminately
responded to every user' who accessed the site.").
264. 1996 WL 7674361 (D. Minn. 1996).
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Internet" cases such as CompuServe.265 In Zippo, the court found that Dot
Com was conducting business in Pennsylvania and, thus, personal
jurisdiction was supported, but the decision was based upon the sale of
3,000 passwords to subscribers in Pennsylvania, and 7 contracts with
Internet access providers in PennsylvaniaZ ' 6 Dot Corn argued that the
contacts in Pennsylvania were initiated by Pennsylvanians who contacted
Dot Corn's Web site, and thus the contacts were "'fortuitous' within the
meaning of World Wide Volkswagen." '67 The court disagreed because Dot
Com "repeatedly and consciously chose to process Pennsylvania resident's
applications and to assign them passwords. Dot Corn knew that the result
of these contracts would be the transmission of electronic messages into
Pennsylvania." '2 The knowledge that the applicants were from
Pennsylvania gave Dot Corn clear notice that it was going to be subject to
suit in Pennsylvania.269 The court's reasoning begs the question: if Dot
Corn's electronic application did not ask for the applicant's address, would
the court then conclude that Dot Corn did not have notice that they were
going to be subject to suit in Pennsylvania? Does willful blindness deprive
Pennsylvania of personal jurisdiction? The answer is not forthcoming.
1. The Additional Conduct Test
In Bensusan, the defendant placed a Web site on the Internet that
contained general information about a jazz club in New York. 70 The site
was not interactive.271 The court stated that "the mere fact that a person can
gain information on the allegedly infringing product is not the equivalent
of a person advertising, promoting, selling or otherwise making an effort
to target its product in New York."27 2 The court cited the Asahi plurality to
support the statement that "[c]reating a site, like placing a product into the
stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide-or even worldwide-but,
without more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward the forum
state."2 73 To adopt this approach would be to treat the World Wide Web as
the courts have traditionally treated any other communication device. Just
because the World Wide Web is more efficient and inexpensive than a
telephone or radio or television does not mean that it is different. Or does
it?

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125.
Id. at 1126.
See id.
lit
See id.
See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 297.
See id.
Id. at 299.
Id. at 301.
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2. The Two-Factor Zippo Test
A more flexible approach was adopted in Zippo. The court considered
the level of interactivity of the site and the commercial nature of the site. 4
The court cited three journal articles275 as support for the two factor test.
The Zippo opinion seems to adopt the personal jurisdiction test for
advertising pronounced in Richard Zembek's article Jurisdictionand the
276
Internet:FundamentalFairnessin theNetworked World of Cyberspace.
Zembek's article proposes:
[W]here an advertiser's promotional activity in the forum
state... entails no physical presence of the advertiser..., the
issue of whether the advertisement in the forum constitutes
minimum contacts remains unanswered. These jurisdictional
questions are resolved based upon the quality of the
advertising contact in relation to the cause of action.... [Ilt
is important to note that courts have paid particular heed to
the volume of business carried on in the forum by the
non-resident. Where, however, an advertising activity is
combined with a substantial sale in the forum state, a forum
may constitutionally assert specific jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant. 2'
The largest benefit of the Zippo test is that it is very flexible. The simple
analogy is that a commercial Web site is an advertisement and should be
treated as such. This approach adopts the highway theory of the Internet.
The individual that contacts a Web site is traveling to the site. Interactive
Web sites send responses to the user. When they do, they are traveling to
the user's site (forum state). The more interactive the Web site, the more
the Web site contacts a forum state. Therefore, the more substantial the
contact and the more likely that a minimum contact exists.

274. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 ('[O]ur review of the available cases and materials reveals

that the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly
proportionate to the nature an quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the

Internet.").
275. See id. at 1124 n.5 (citing Robert A. Bourque & Kerry L. Konrad, Avoiding Jurisdiction
Based on Internet Web Site, N.Y.L.J. (Dec. 10, 1996); David Bender, Emerging Personal
Jurisdiction Issues on the Internet, 453 PLI/Pat 7 (1996); Richard S. Zembek, Comment,
Jurisdiction and the Internet: FundamentalFairness in the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6
ALB. L.J. Sci. & TEcH. 339 (1996)).

276. Zembek, supra note 275, at 339.

277. Id. at 368-69 (citations omitted).
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Physical boundaries typically have framed legal boundaries,
in effect creating signposts that warn that we will be required
after crossing to abide by different rules. To impose
traditional territorial concepts on the commercial uses of the
Internet has dramatic implications, opening the Web user up
to inconsistent regulations throughout fifty states, indeed,
throughout the globe.278
C. The CyberspaceModel
The Cyberspace approach is the narrowest approach. Simply put, there
is no physical presence associated with Internet contacts. All contacts exist
in Cyberspace.279 Thus, if a person in California contacts a Web site in
New York, the contact does not occur in either New York or California. To
date, no court has adopted the Cyberspace approach to the Internet. To do
so would be to deprive all courts of jurisdiction over the Internet.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Cyberspace model of the Internet seems the most appropriate but
this reeks havoc on the traditional model of jurisdiction. Historically,
courts have used physical location as alimitation onjurisdiction. Under the
Pennoyerregime, states' powers were limited by their borders.28 ° If you
were within a state, then you were subject to the state's authority. The
Pennoyer test for personal jurisdiction reigned for numerous years.281
Eventually, the judicial system was forced to expand the states' power by
granting personal jurisdiction based on minimum contacts within the state.
The minimum contacts test, like the Pennoyertest before it, has reigned for
numerous years. Now, the Internet creates a difficult problem for the
judicial system. The Internet is a medium in which activities are not tied
to a physical location.282 To date, the judicial system has attempted to deal
with the Internet under the historical minimum contacts test by assigning
physical locations to Internet events. This seems a temporary cure.
A good example of the difficulty is aWeb page. Where is aWeb page?
You could argue that a Web page is located on the computer where the

278. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997).
279. The term Cyberspace was first coined by William Gibson in Neuromancer. Cyberspace
is "[a] consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every
nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts.... A graphic representation of data

abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system." WIHLLAM GEBsON,
NEUROMANCER 51 (1984).
280. See supra note 9.
281. Seesupra note 12.
282. See supra note 2.
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information is stored. But what if the information contained in a Web page
is contained on numerous computers? What if there are multiple copies of
the information? For instance, Web browser programs make copies of the
Web pages visited by a user and store them in cache directories on the
user's computer. Is the Web page now located on every computer that
visits it? To assign a physical location to a Web page on the Internet would
be to engage in an arbitrary fiction, which would inevitably lead to the
spider web result in which every state has jurisdiction. As the number of
copies of the information increases, the number of physical locations for
the Web page would increase exponentially. Eventually, there would be
copies in every jurisdiction. If the judicial system treats these copies as
puiposeful contacts, then the state in which the copy is located could assert
personal jurisdiction. This gives rise to the same problems as the spider
Web approach. An individual placing information on the Internet will be
subject to regulation by every state and nation with no guarantee that the
regulations will not conflict.
The simplest and most complete solution would be to federally regulate
the Internet and adopt the Cyberspace model to the Internet. Under the
doctrine of preemption, 83 federal regulations would prevent conflicting
regulation by the states. Furthermore, adopting the Cyberspace model
avoids the current difficulties associated with Internet based personal
jurisdiction. The need for regulation is increasing dramatically in areas
such as Internet gambling and money laundering. Furthermore, Federal
regulation would avoid the conceptual problems associated with assigning
physical locations to Internet events. After all, to say that when an
individual navigates the Internet the individual consciously decides to enter
into every state and nation is difficult to fathom. Rather, an individual sits
down at a computer and merely presses keys. The individual's computer
displays different information without indicating the location of that
information. To federally regulate the Internet would add a great deal of
certainty to Internet use.

283. See BLACK'S LAW DICriONARY 1177 (6th ed. 1990) ("Doctrine adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court holding that certain matters are of such a national, as opposed to local, character
that federal laws preempt or take precedence over state laws. As such, a state may not pass a law
inconsistent with the federal law. Examples are federal laws governing interstate commerce."). See
also U.S. CONST. art. VI cl. 2 ("[The Laws of the United States .... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land.").
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